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White Cube and Black Box: 
Irwin, Turrell and the return of the subject in 1960s and 1970s art and psychology

This paper addresses two key and related paradigms that had a profound effect on developments in ‘dematerializing’ Southern California installation art in the late 1960s and 1970s: the ‘black box,’ understood in psychological circles as a metaphor for the inscrutability of conscious thought, and the ‘white cube,’ the pristine, even antiseptic, space of the high modern gallery.​[1]​ I argue that instead of doing away with art or ‘dematerializing’ it, light and space artists Robert Irwin and James Turrell shifted the notion of what constitutes ‘material’; rather than the stuff of traditional artistic media, they considered human consciousness to be the essential matter of art. In order to take such a stance, however, they needed to accept a position that human consciousness is indeed material rather than epiphenomenal (acting only upon itself in Cartesian isolation). They created a phenomenologically conditional art that necessarily pries open the black box and in so doing, undermines, or even obliterates, the presumed neutrality of the white cube, rendering it profoundly visible. 
It is useful by way of comparison to understand the critical tradition that separated the black box and white cube. Tony Smith’s Die (1962) is quintessentially minimal. It is unreadable, impermeable. Yet oddly, in 1967 art critic Michael Fried asserted in his (still) provocative essay, Art and Objecthood, that it was the latent anthropomorphism of such a thing that made it so ‘literal’ (at 72 inches cubed, Die occupies the space of a large man).​[2]​ While Die does not “speak” to the critic, he nevertheless ascribes to it human qualities. To Fried, the intransigence of the object deflected viewer attention onto its context, which included the viewer’s own immediate experience. In the same essay, Fried also considers an anecdote from Smith in which the artist describes an epiphanic experience on the New Jersey turnpike where Smith claims that the revelations of such a moment might result in no less than the end of art for him. For Fried, the experience is no more than an “empty, or ‘abandoned’ situation”; lacking an art object, it cannot be art at all. The situation, he asserts, “reveal[s] the theatrical character of literalist art, only without the object, that is, without the art itself – as though the object is needed only within a room.” ​[3]​ Although Fried’s essay has been thoroughly dissected by now, there are two elements in his argument that need to be considered further in this context: first, the anthropomorphic possibilities of inscrutability and second, his unease with the role of experience as art. How did Fried arrive at a position that sees art as expressive, while muteness is essentially human and experience is unreliable? 
The limitations of a methodology like Fried’s show up in any world that accepts Robert Irwin’s 1˚2˚3˚4˚ (1997) as art. 1˚2˚3˚4˚ can be aptly described in Fried’s terms as a situation that is not only ‘empty’ but continuously emptying. In this work, Irwin facilitates an interplay between the museum gallery and external conditions of its coastal Southern California setting (the Museum of Contemporary Art in La Jolla). Three precise cuts in the heavy glass windows release the stale museum air while admitting unfiltered light and the sound of the surf below, intermingled with the sights and sounds of human activity both beyond the walls and within them. Two cuts on either side (24” h x 30” w) intersect mitred windows in the front corners of the room while the centre cut (24”h x 26” w) is flush with the glass.​[4]​ The room, transformed into an aesthetic situation by whomever views it as such, requires no object. 1˚2˚3˚4˚, derived from negation, owes its fluctuating presence to the conscious attention of its viewer/listeners, and ceases to exist as art in their absence. In this sense 1˚2˚3˚4˚ is a late manifestation of what Andrew Perchuk has deemed Irwin’s “refusal of the gestalt,” Irwin’s insistent concern with the dynamic and immediate properties of the work of art.​[5]​ 
	Irwin’s insistence that the properties of a work of art are experientially contingent departs from the psychological model that had dominated in American laboratories and universities for the first half of the twentieth century —behaviourism, which saw behavior as the only appropriate subject for scientific testing, while the idiosyncrasies of subjective experience remained the purview of psychoanalysis and philosophy. Behaviorist B.F. Skinner explains: “A person is first of all an organism … The organism becomes a person as it acquires a repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of reinforcement to which it is exposed during its lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment is under the control of a current setting. It is able to acquire such a repertoire under such control because of processes of conditioning which are also part of its genetic endowment.”​[6]​ Non-behavioral factors in human development such as thought, feelings and ideas belong (to Skinner’s way of thinking) to a mentalist viewpoint: because it is manifest, behavior is the only aspect of human learning not ‘locked in’ the black box. It is not that Skinner does not acknowledge the phenomenology of the situation, but the messy inexplicability of it forces him to leave it aside. The behaviorist’s means of dealing with this problem is to conduct his experiments in a laboratory where phenomenal nuances can at least be constrained if not controlled outright.​[7]​ 
There runs a parallel between such language and much of what was going on in the art world in the first half of the twentieth century. In Fried’s interpretation a work of art (as opposed to a mere object) acts as the stimulus, eliciting a response from the viewer; furthermore, this interaction takes place in a carefully prescribed environment meant to maximize stimulation: the white cube. Like its scientific model, the behaviorist lab, the museum gallery was designed to be as ideally “neutral” as possible (its own salience minimized by white paint and muted lighting).​[8]​ By excluding consciousness in our consideration of the aesthetic encounter we separate input (the observable qualities of an object) from output (response). What happens in between the two remains unconsidered. This is apt if your model is a behaviorist one, which charges that input and output ―more commonly referred to in psychological circles as ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’― constitute the measurable (and therefore appropriately material and scientific) content of human experience. The art object emanates or communicates its secrets to an attentive but otherwise passive viewer. Meaning (immeasurable and atemporal), is not so much set aside, however, as set apart. 	
	 Although far from taking any psychological stance in art criticism, Michael Fried shares with behaviorists an understanding of experience as off-limits to analysis. I think this is what makes something like Tony Smith’s Die so ‘human’ to him (apart from its human scale): the sculpture ‘hides its thoughts’; whereas for Fried (and behaviorists) an art object ―or stimulus― is expressive, while the beholder ―or test subject― absorbs its qualities: what she brings to the situation is less important than what what she understands the work of art to be “saying.” Situational art such as Irwin’s shows the character of any object to be dependent upon what goes on inside the observer’s own ‘black box.’ This does not mean that an object (whether Fried names it art or not) ceases to exist without a conscious viewer present but it certainly cannot be known. 
I do think, however, that Fried is a keen observer of the phenomenology of his own experience: though he finds subjective perceptual states as problematic with regard to what he terms art (as opposed to objecthood), he and fellow formalists ―Clement Greenberg in particular― provide well-articulated evidence for someone who is seeking to explain how aesthetic engagement takes place. In a retrospective essay Fried writes: “Is there another frontline art critic writing in the 1960s who harped on the importance of bodily experience to the extent that I did? I can’t think of one.” ​[9]​  And this is what makes Fried’s assessment so perplexing and yet useful to anyone getting at the nature of phenomenal art: to understand an art that sees consciousness as its medium we need to know what it feels like. In her discussion of Fried’s aversion to the temporality of minimal art in Art and Objecthood, Pamela Lee writes: “ … no text articulates the particular mechanics of minimalism’s reception as brilliantly as its does, in spite of its antagonism toward the work in question.”​[10]​ He is better than most at describing the events of aesthetic engagement yet simultaneously refuses their role in the meaning of the work.
Consciousness is not particularly necessary to behavior. We conduct our lives to a large extent via unconscious means.​[11]​ But experience is another matter; it is shaped by our thoughts and memories and aesthetic experience in particular is delineated by our faculty of attention. An art critic necessarily hones his attentional faculties to works of art, providing him with more material from which to articulate the experience.  Consciousness follows attention slavishly. To be sure, the sensory properties of the art object serve to snare and possibly hold that attention, but the experiments of light and space artists undermine the role of salience by presenting situations where all the perceptual ‘snags’ have been smoothed out, leaving us with no thing to attend, and yet there is no denying the intensity of somehow ‘un-stimulated’ viewer response. Asked to attend to a vacuum, the viewer can make art of anything, or even nothing. 
	In Southern California, economic and geographical factors created the perfect laboratory for linking psychology to technology to the making of art and the development of a conditional aesthetic. For a Southern Californian, there is a disorienting incongruence between the immediacy of nature and the ever-present technology in the industries of aerospace and high-tech research.​[12]​ The formidable presence of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena (with names on its faculty that at different times included Einstein, Oppenheimer and Feynman) ensured that the physical sciences played an important role in educational and community developments. In its wake were drawn businesses and organizations that included the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Lockheed Air Corporation, the Rand Institute and Garrett Corporation, all of which contributed to the L.A. County Museum of Art’s ambitious and controversial Art and Technology program at the end of the 1960s and influenced the work of light and space artists.​[13]​ The art world was not exempt from these influences. The ‘finish-fetish’ aesthetic of much 1960s California art is often attributed to the influences of high-tech on artistic experimentation. As Michael Compton pointed out in a 1970 catalogue discussing the work of light and space artists Larry Bell, Robert Irwin and Doug Wheeler: “The aerospace industry … is not only orientated to rapid obsolescence but therefore also to technological extemporisation and to free access to outside experts, techniques and information. The preoccupations with precision, environmental and sensory control are naturally shared [by these artists] with this industry.”​[14]​ 	
Within this context, the theories of quantum physics played an important role in shattering previously held tenets of what constituted scientific inquiry and knowledge. Writes physicist, Henry Stapp: “In quantum physics, experience is the essential reality, and matter is viewed as a representation of the primary reality, which is experience.”​[15]​ The new developments and challenges that arose with the space race and atomic physics stretched the parameters of what had been considered reality to its breaking point, so that as Mike Davis puts it in his popular history of Los Angeles (City of Quartz), “In Southern California physics and meta-physics continued to rub shoulders in a variety of weird circumstances.”​[16]​ In between the two was the developing field of psychophysics that was perhaps even more rigorously empiricist than behaviorism but at the same time took the physicists’ approach that no matter was too small or elusive to be scientifically understood.
	In late 1967, Maurice Tuchman, then senior curator for the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, set out to marry contemporary art and the technology of the L.A. region by inviting corporations to become the resources —both financial and technical— for a number of artists whose work already tended toward or somehow engaged industrial materials and/or production.​[17]​ One of the first artists Tuchman approached was Robert Irwin, whose recent “discs,” first in spun aluminum and then in cast acrylic, necessitated machined precision to achieve the seamlessness the artist obsessively sought between the knife-edge of the discs and the wall/ground behind them. But Irwin was on the verge of doing away with the art object entirely in favour of investigating its circumstances: the subjective body states of the viewer and the supposedly neutral ‘white cube’. He was interested in making the experiential transition between the work of art and its context as fluid as possible. The discs, when lit according to Irwin’s exacting standards, were so ethereal, so subtle that anything in the room of more substance —a crack, an electrical outlet— could easily distract the viewer from the attentive moment. In his biography of Irwin, Lawrence Weschler writes: “ He began to wonder how it might be possible to make an art of the incidental, the peripheral, the transitory —an art of things not looked at (indeed, invisible when looked at directly) yet still somehow perceived.”​[18]​ 
That Irwin believed that a perceptible, yet non-salient art object was even a possibility tells us that his understanding of perception and its effects had moved far beyond the realm of measurable input and output. By rejecting the object as the locus for aesthetic inquiry, he and other light and space artists placed their own work at the “periphery of a body of knowledge” about how the senses and mind work in unison to create human consciousness. Aesthetics therefore became no longer the exclusive milieu of artists and philosophers but of psychologists and neurologists, physicists, and anyone else who determined that it is possible and paramount to understand what the ‘black box’ does. With James Turrell, Irwin would design a series of experiments demonstrating that even when the senses are given nothing to work with the mind insists upon creating a relationship between the body and its environment; that is, to the mind’s eye nothing is just as substantive as something. Under such circumstances — where we perceive meaning in the event of our encounter— it seems preposterous to situate meaning in objects alone. 
Irwin recognized that time and space are inextricable features of aesthetic experience or ―of consciousness itself for that matter― whether one is contemplating a painting or the clouds in the sky. And he was an adamant defender of the empirical nature of that experience. “Circumstance … encompasses all of the conditions, qualities and consequences making up the real context of your being in the world. There is embedded in any set of circumstances and your being in them the dynamic of a past and future, what was, how it came to be, what it is, and what it may come to be.”​[19]​ 
	These investigations therefore also interest those cognitive scientists who want to demonstrate that consciousness is not epiphenomenal or peripheral but as “respectable, useful and probably necessary.”​[20]​ In this work phenomenology is naturalized, which is a key to any understanding of consciousness that is going to get beyond the explanatory gap created by the input-output model. A phenomenal approach keeps in balance the form, content and context of conscious thought. As the editors of Naturalizing Phenomenology write: “…explaining what is happening inside the black box is not explaining what is happening for the black box, so to speak. It is one thing to try to account for what is going on in the brain ―at whatever level of explanation― … and another one to try to account for what we feel or think is going on…”​[21]​ 
Tuchman’s Art and Technology project afforded the perfect opportunity for Irwin to study the nature of attention in the form of a series of “sensory deprivation” experiments. Irwin was matched with Lockheed Aircraft and later, along with James Turrell, with the Garrett Corporation where the artists were interested in the psychological experiments being performed at these facilities. Irwin’s ‘wish list’ to Lockheed included “investigations necessary to determine what perceptual awarenesses [sic] are necessary for basic orientation and stability … human prowess … [and] basic necessities for maintaining sanity.”​[22]​ 
Clearly, the question of orientation was foremost in Irwin’s mind. Orientation is the phenomenon that allows us to establish our position relative to the circumstances in which we find - or become - ourselves. It is central to any idea of the self in space. When we find ourselves in familiar circumstances orientation is maintained beneath our conscious notice. A subtle interrelation of sensory data and neural adjustment allows us the luxurious illusion of constancy as we go about our days. In The Brain’s Sense of Movement, Alain Berthoz delineates how the brain constructs this remarkable illusion through a complex system of checks and balances between sensory input and neural adjustments. What is most notable about orientation is its fluidity. It must remain unstable in order to seem consistent. Without this paradox we could ostensibly lose our balance every time we turned our heads. “Perception,” writes Berthoz, “is an interpretation; its coherence is a construction whose rules depend on endogenous factors and on the actions that we plan. The difficulty in building a theory of coherence is that there is most likely not one single coherent theory for all of perception. … This range of possibilities is probably a key to the way illusions are manufactured.”​[23]​ Furthermore, as Berthoz asserts, the maintenance of sensory coherence relies on input from the brain (still unconscious) that “[modulates] sensory information at its source, to adapt it to the requirements of movement …”​[24]​ This adaptive mechanism of the neural networks is significant in understanding the outcome of some of Irwin and Turrell’s tests. 
Lockheed’s Rye Canyon research facility proved promising for investigating sense and orientation. There, staff used anechoic and other “sensory deprivation” chambers to test human reactions to sensory stimuli in controlled environments. An anechoic chamber is so heavily insulated as to reduce reverberation to a near zero sum. It is also light insulated and so provides a soundproof, lightless environment. Any sensory input would (at least theoretically) have to be introduced and perhaps more importantly, could be controlled. For Irwin especially, who had been expending so much time attempting to reduce contextual distraction with regard to his earlier painting experiments, including the discs, these chambers represented a clean slate in which to investigate experience.​[25]​ 
And distraction ―that which catches us unaware while attending to something else― ironically became the focus of Irwin and Turrell’s experiments. Unlike the normal “silence” in our lives, which might nevertheless include the hum of machinery or chirping of birds, the silence of the anechoic chamber even blocks out the sounds you make yourself in an odd way. “[I]t was suspended so that even the rotation of the earth was not reflected in it, or any sounds being bounced through the earth,” said Irwin, “… Nothing went into that space. And no light at all.”​[26]​  Without reverberation, “outside noises” that we may make such as snapping our fingers become overly internalized. There is no there in which the snapping can occur. You are well aware that you are snapping your fingers but the sound of that snapping has no resonance. “When I clicked my tongue,” stated one subject,” – it had a dull, faraway sound.”​[27]​
Irwin and Turrell’s insistence upon the contingencies of experience utterly displaced the presentness of autonomous art with absences, leaving (quite literally) nothing to which one could attach attributes.​[28]​ The relative nature of meaningful engagement in such art has also become a key issue in contemporary consciousness theory. Bernard Baars has proposed that our brains engage in contrastive phenomenology. “Consciousness,” he writes, “appears to be the major adaptive faculty of the brain. Our personal experience of the world is the subjective aspect of that adaptive activity. Philosophical arguments against the adaptive function of awareness rely on a little verbal magic, in which we pretend to suck out all the real features of consciousness — usually the ones that happen to be externally observable today — and ask, is anything left after we take away everything, except the last residuum of subjectivity?”​[29]​ Baars could well be describing Michael Fried’s idealizing approach to works of art. 
Situational art refuses such an interpretation by constantly intervening with uncertainties. In other words, consciousness is not about fixing qualities to perceived objects but rather, a continuous cycle of adaptation of the percept to an illusion of constancy that keeps us oriented to our surroundings. If our perceptual circumstances change in extreme and unexpected ways, the adjustment must likewise require more effort. This points to the necessity of disorientation to Irwin and Turrell’s experiments; it defers judgement, leaving the viewer considering her own uncertainties and cutting off the possibility for ascribing to the work of art what Fried terms “presentness.” The experience of doing nothing was extremely disconcerting to subjects new to the project and they would report feeling uncomfortable after very brief periods (less than ten minutes) while the artists would happily spend hours in the chamber.​[30]​  
In the early 1960s Robert Irwin had already been experimenting with a form of self-imposed sensory deprivation, by locking himself in his studio for days at a time, spending long hours contemplating the perceptual properties of his “line” paintings (large canvasses of saturated colour interrupted by one, two, or three horizontal lines of another tone) using relentless boredom to help him reduce his art to its essential matter; which ultimately turned out to be his own conscious response.​[31]​ In his biography of Irwin, Lawrence Weschler describes this eventuality: “Back at home, you may remember what it felt like to stand before the painting, the texture of the meditative state it put you in, but the canvas itself, its image in your mind, will be evanescent.”​[32]​ 
Considering Irwin’s long experience attending to very little in his studio, it is not stretching to assert that he came to the experiments already adapted to the situation to some extent. Irwin and Turrell’s extraordinary involvement with the anechoic chamber (according to Irwin, six to eight hour stints compared to several minutes for most subjects​[33]​) was possible because as artists they had already developed attentional faculties that saw more in less, from paying disproportionate attention to what would otherwise be filtered out by a constantly self-regulating perceptual system. In 1974, in his apology for consciousness as a viable field of study, George Mandler discussed the exceptional sensory capacities of someone with heightened attentional capacities, usually in meditation: 
 … the relationship between the object or event and ourselves is changed continuously by our mutual relations with the rest of the world. The new information, in a way, is always acquired in new contexts. … This restriction of possible relations presumably provides not only the illusion but possibly also the reality of depth of perception which the special experience provides. In contrast, artists and scientists, for example, apparently achieve the same depth of perception of special objects or events without the meditative experience.” [my emphasis]​[34]​   

In other words, as physicists had been asserting for half a century, there may be a whole lot more to nothing than first meets the eye, if one can find a way to reduce the distractions of things sufficiently to attend to it. Asserts astronomer Sten Odenwald , “Space enters our perceptible world only in an oblique way. Because of this, we have to look carefully into our daily experiences to remind ourselves that there is something to wonder about. You need look only as far as the page of this book you are now reading to experience one of the most ancient and puzzling mysteries of the Void. You see the page and its letters; you do not, however, see the space that separates the page from your eyes”​[35]​ This ought to sound familiar by now. It is what made the cave form so useful to Plato: in normal situations we fail to recognize the situation that facilitates illusion. Likewise, in the modernist’s art world the white cube facilitates the illusion of discreet, salient and inherently meaningful art objects. But, writes Robert Irwin: “[a]s one educated and practiced as a painter, my first hint (intuition) that the world of my perceptual and aesthetic concerns might not begin and end at the edge of my canvas was something that had no tangible reality. But my question would not go away and it was soon joined by others.”​[36]​
	Without the unattended interstices of our perceptual world, things cannot be things. Both Odenwald and Irwin, in their own ways, are demonstrating means of attending to the gaps in our perception. Although not tangible, they play a significant role in perceptual experiences and are “things” to the extent that they have effects. Our relationship with the page depends upon that unseen void which Odenwald describes. The centrality of the canvas depends upon the fact that its context is unattended by the viewer. As proof of this phenomenon, we need only compare this “normalized” experience with that of one of Irwin and Turrell’s Art and Technology subjects who is placed in a completely darkened anechoic chamber for a period of isolation no longer than 10 minutes. Upon being asked how the room felt, the subject (a 25-year old female student) answered: “Hard to put a shape to it. Flat in front of me. Hallucinations had shallow depth. On looking straight ahead, I felt light converging on the sides as if from behind, but when I turned it was even darker.”​[37]​ The subjects repeatedly claimed to have feelings of “convergence” and “claustrophobia.” The unseen void that maintains a healthy distance between the world of objects and us breaks down when there are no sensory referents to maintain it. Without reverberation, sounds occur “in the head” or a sneeze “sticks” to the body. Without the transparency of light to see through, air cloaks us and weighs us down, presses in on the body. The subject said she felt claustrophobic when she tried to look around.​[38]​ 							
The artists were especially interested in the relationship between sensory response inside the sphere and the experience upon stepping outside again.  As Irwin told Weschler:
There were all kinds of interesting things about being in there which we observed, but the most dramatic had to do with how the world appeared once you stepped out. After I’d sat in there for six hours, for instance, and then got up and walked back home down the same street I’d come in on, the trees were still trees and the street was still a street, and the houses were still houses, but the world did not look the same; it was very, very noticeably altered.​[39]​ 

Irwin’s “sharp-focus” walk down the street came after several hours in the anechoic chamber but even subjects who spent only minutes there reported that normal sound was sharply louder for some time afterward. Coherence, in a state of perpetually attended blackness, becomes something very different from what “makes sense” on the street.  That our sensory organs adjust to circumstance should be obvious to anyone who has stood blinking in the glare when a light is suddenly turned on but that fact is too often conveniently forgotten in our need to stabilize what we see in order to orient ourselves. 
	For James Turrell, the anechoic chamber was a natural extension of much of his previous work. He had more formal training in perception and consciousness studies than did Irwin, whose interests in the same subject were at this time still largely intuitive. Turrell had studied experimental psychology in college, was well versed in the terminology and methodology and (perhaps as importantly) in phenomenological philosophy.​[40]​  His work began with environmental experiments in contrast to Irwin’s traditional training as a painter. The Mendota stoppages (1969-1974) was a on-site installation in his Santa Monica studio where the artist ‘stopped up’ the windows except for carefully controlled apertures, which allowed the ambient external light (sunshine in the daytime, streetlights and passing cars at night) to animate the space. The work of art was utterly temporal; the light played upon the walls as the sun set, as the streetlights came on, and then more urgently as passing headlights breached the stoppages and criss-crossed the interior walls. Turrell’s interventions operated in an analogous way to the stops in an organ, by simultaneously suppressing and admitting light. Nighttime was the lively movement that followed a sedate daytime pattern. In direct contrast to the expressive object, then, this work allowed salience to ‘leak in.’​[41]​ 
Turrell’s other previous works also used the visual language of experimental psychology. In his light projection, Afrum-photo, Turrell presents us with a white cube now floating in a black box. Like a ‘Necker Cube’ illusion, the projected cube oscillates between projection and recession according to our willed perception. Furthermore, as the viewer walks around it, the cube appears to rotate. The illusionary aspects of the projection pieces led Turrell to claim that they are more like paintings than sculpture, since it is a two-dimensional surface in reality that “alludes to unsolveable [sic] three-dimensional things.”​[42]​ 
A second important type of experimental device made available to the artists and commonly used in sensory deprivation experiments was a Ganzfeld sphere. A Ganzfeld, the visual equivalent of an anechoic chamber, reduces sensory input as nearly to an absolute neutral as possible — this time however, in terms of vision. The “whole field” of the sphere is finished in a uniform grey: must be utterly smooth because the Ganzfeld relies upon a perfectly even distribution of light. The effect of looking at a stimulus of no colour variation whatsoever is the feeling of looking at nothing at all. The field of vision becomes utterly formless. There is no horizon or clearly defined object of any sort by which to orient oneself.​[43]​ The effect is one of a strange vast intimacy. 
Ganzfeld technology, and related light diffusion experiments, transform the white cube of the exhibiting space, perhaps even rendering it wondrous. Turrell’s light experiments reveal that its neutrality is an illusion. With works like Afrum Photo or in larger room installations such as Virga (1974) at Villa Panza in which the artist again transforms the whole space into a situation for considering the nature of light, this white cube cannot be the white cube. With Virga Turrell has taken the principles of the Mendota Stoppages  and combined them with the ganzfeld, creating a white room in which two veils of even whiter light descend from thin, carefully calibrated fissures in the ceiling of a room 147” wide x 176” high x 369” long, with the effect of separating the rectangular room into shrouded thirds. It does not serve to enhance the salience of an art object, or even its own but to hold in the visitor’s attention an awareness of her own sensibilities to light and space.
	After the Art and Technology experiments, Robert Irwin continued to collaborate closely with Garrett staff psychologist Ed Wortz, whose influence propelled the artist to delve deeper into issues of consciousness and cognition. His work no longer involved an art object per se, but was built “in response” to a site (at times in a gallery; at other times not). His installations involved the subtle and precise use of scrims that diffused natural light into sometimes translucent, sometimes opaque “fields” (with more subtle but similar effects to those of Turrell’s Virga). These works demanded a great deal of the viewer. There was very little about them that caught the eye. You needed to come to them with the expectation of attending to the piece in the absence of anything that might “distract” you into paying attention.​[44]​ 
	In contrast, for someone like Michael Fried the art object must have “presentness,” a quality that supersedes circumstance, yet requires an object to which it can attach. But Fried must rely on autobiographical evidence to make this claim; his only means of determining that such an a-temporal quality belongs to a work of art is to indeed engage with the art in question in real time. The critic has mistaken what he feels for his why he feels it: a behaviorist error. By citing “presentness” as an a priori characteristic of artistic (as opposed to “theatrical”) phenomena Fried has made the error of “ignoring first-person phenomenological as well as third-person empirical constraints in the formation of [his] basic conceptual tools.”​[45]​ He has transformed his own physiological response into an objective criterion of aesthetic judgement, not just for himself but also for the reader with whom he shares this insight.  Furthermore, he seems to be trusting that another viewer will recognize “presentness” when she comes across it ―as if such a property exists apart from human consciousness. By doing so, Fried has himself extorted complicity from the reader. 
A description is not an explanation; this is the key limitation in Fried’s methodology and of behaviorism. Irwin and Turrell’s work demonstrates immediately the pitfalls of relying too much on abstract frameworks (philosophical or scientific) to understand cognitive phenomena. If we are to rely on a method such as Fried’s the question of what constitutes aesthetic experience is necessarily set aside for the sake of a rigorous determination of what constitutes the correct properties of an art stimulus. We have not arrived at the explanadum of aesthetic experience. In an interview Irwin described how the Art and Technology experiments loosens abstract constructs: “I think that what happens is that in our ordinary lives we move through the world with a strong expectation-fit ratio which we use as much to block out information which is not critical to our activity. …So that what the anechoic chamber was helping us to see was the extreme complexity and richness of our sense mechanism and how little of it we use most of the time. We edit from it severely, in time to see only what we expect to see.”​[46]​
It needs to be emphasized that the intense interest in matters of consciousness taken by these artists does not mean that their methods should be construed as scientific in any way sufficiently rigorous for a practising scientist. This is significant because it maintains the specifically artistic nature of the experimentation in question. The scientists who populated the laboratories of the UCLA psychology labs or Garrett or Lockheed were necessarily subject to the rigors and strictures of laboratory research. By utilizing experimentation for aesthetic ends, Irwin and Turrell produced a usefully useless means of physical understanding: they did not require results, only experience. Indeed, there was and is often a great deal of ‘slippage’ in the phenomenological approach, resulting at times in a curious amalgam of science and mysticism long popular in the Los Angeles area.​[47]​ In a popular history of L.A.s curious hybridity, Farnsworth Crowder writes: “Whatever waves, oscillates, vibrates, pulses or surges contributes by analogy, to the explanations of harmony, absent treatment, telepathy, magnetic healing, vibratory equilibrium, spiritualism or any other cloudy wonder.”​[48]​ In any case, it is important to note that psychological laboratory methods and prejudices inform an understanding of the relationship of the work to its context, just as the long-held dictates of behaviorism and its isolation of the subjective conscious informed previous artistic and gallery practices.














^1	  Both of these terms —“dematerialization” and “white cube”— have proliferated in discussions of artistic developments from the 1960s onwards. “Dematerialization” stems from an influential essay by Lucy Lippard and John Chandler: “The Dematerialization of Art,” Art International (February 1968). In the essay the authors discuss the conceptual developments —including minimalism— of American avant-garde art that appear to privilege thought or action over the creation of art objects per se. “White Cube” describes the modernist gallery, an ideally neutralized space in which to present works of art as autonomous entities. This neutrality was roundly challenged on ideological grounds in Brian O’Doherty’s famous essay: “Inside the White Cube” (Inside the White Cube. San Francisco: Lapis Press, 1976).
^2	  Michael Fried. Art and Obejcthood (Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1998), p.155-156.
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